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September 2026 IssueExplore
MEDIA

The Licence Is a Public Trust Nobody Audits

Broadcasters hold public spectrum on the condition that they serve the public interest. The condition is real, it is in the statute, and almost nothing turns on it.

Helen Straiton writes on the economics of publishing and what happens to the record when a title changes hands. She reads accounts and preservation policy.

Last updated September 3, 2026
An AM radio mast radiator with guy wires against the sky, in high contrast black and white with coarse grain
A mast radiator. The spectrum it uses is public property, lent on terms.

Ildar Sagdejev (Specious) — CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

September 3, 20264 min read

A broadcaster does not own the frequency it transmits on. The spectrum is public, and a licence is permission to use a piece of it, granted on a condition that sounds substantial and is stated in the statute.

The condition is service in the public interest. The communications law uses the phrase repeatedly, and it is the legal basis on which the whole licensing structure rests.

What the phrase requires has never been settled, which is the interesting part. It has meant different things in different decades, expanded and contracted with the regulator's composition, and it has rarely meant anything a licensee needed to plan around.

A condition that is never enforced is not a condition. It is a preamble.

Renewal is where this becomes visible. The process exists, the rules governing it are detailed, and the overwhelming majority of licences are renewed. That is not evidence of a conspiracy. It is what happens when the standard is undefined and the burden sits with a challenger.

Challenging a renewal requires money, standing and years. The benefit of a successful challenge is diffuse and public. The cost is concentrated and private, which is the shape of problem that reliably goes unsolved.

Meanwhile the underlying bargain has quietly changed. The spectrum was lent when broadcast was the only way to reach a mass audience. It is now one distribution channel among many, and the licensee's most valuable asset may be a national brand rather than the frequency.

That weakens the public interest claim in one direction and strengthens it in another. A broadcaster matters less than it did, and the spectrum it holds is worth more to somebody else than it has ever been.

The obvious response is to auction more of it, and much has been. What auctions cannot price is the thing the condition was for, which is local coverage of the kind that has no buyer and that no auction will produce.

So the licence sits in an awkward position. It is justified by an obligation nobody measures, in a market where the obligation is least commercially viable, held under rules written for an industry that no longer exists in the form they assume.

The narrow fix is measurement rather than enforcement. Require licensees to report, in a standard form published in the public record, what local reporting they actually produced, and let the number sit next to the condition.

That does not force anyone to do anything, which is why it might survive. It would make the gap between the promise and the practice a fact on a page rather than an argument, and facts on pages are how conditions eventually acquire teeth.

The counter-argument from broadcasters is stronger than critics usually allow and should be stated. A licensee competing with platforms that carry no public interest obligation at all is being asked to bear a cost its competitors do not.

That is true, and it is an argument about who else should be regulated rather than an argument that the condition should lapse. The spectrum is still public and still lent.

The deeper difficulty is that the obligation was written for an era when the licence conferred something close to a local monopoly on reaching an audience. The obligation was the price of the monopoly.

With the monopoly gone, the price looks arbitrary, which is exactly why measurement matters more than enforcement. A published record of what local coverage a licensee actually produced would settle, in public, whether the condition still means anything.

The auction alternative deserves a fair hearing because it is the most coherent rival proposal. Sell the spectrum outright, let it go to whoever values it most, and fund public interest programming directly from the proceeds.

That has the considerable merit of making the subsidy explicit. The current arrangement hides a transfer inside a licence condition, and a hidden transfer is one nobody has to defend at a budget hearing.

The objection is that the proceeds are spent once and the obligation would have been permanent, which is the trade every one-off sale of a public asset makes.

Neither approach solves the underlying difficulty, which is that local coverage has no buyer at any price. That is the thing the condition was for, and it is the thing no market arrangement has yet produced.

Further reading

Helen Straiton writes for The 13th Bell on media. This piece was edited and fact checked before publication.

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