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September 2026 IssueExplore
THE POWER OF THE PURSE

A Deadline Is Not a Veto

Five days before the fiscal year ends, the White House has asked Congress to cancel $810 million it has already appropriated. The request does not have to pass. The clock Congress wrote into the Impoundment Control Act is now long enough to outlive the money.

Owen Blackwood reports on legislatures and the procedural machinery inside them. He reads bill text and the record rather than press releases.

Last updated September 27, 2026
The colonnade of the United States Treasury building seen from below with a flag on the roofline, in a slate and bone duotone
The money in eleven accounts stops being money at midnight on Wednesday. Whether that happens because Congress voted or because it did not is the whole of the argument. File photograph.

GREG BULLA — Unsplash

September 27, 20266 min read

The statement went onto the White House website at 9.38 on Friday night, five days before the fiscal year ends. It says the President is “utilizing a pocket rescission for another nearly $1 billion of the most harmful government spending,” and then lists eleven accounts with a figure beside each, from $567 million of refugee and entrant assistance at Health and Human Services down to $5 million for the Office of Minority Health.

Add the eleven together and they come to $810 million, Senator Susan Collins’s figure and the one in most headlines. The larger number is not a larger accounting; it is the same money, rounded up in the government’s own sentence and repeated by everyone who quoted it. One package, two numbers, and the bigger one belongs to the administration.

The dollars are not what makes this worth an argument. The mechanism is, because it does not require Congress to agree to anything.

The clock is the instrument

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 exists because Richard Nixon declined to spend money Congress had appropriated, and Congress wrote down what a president may do about that. Under 2 U.S.C. 683, a president who wants to cancel an appropriation sends a special message naming the amount, the account, the reasons and the fiscal effect. Then comes the sentence the quarrel turns on: any amount proposed to be rescinded “shall be made available for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescission bill.”

Read that as a rule about silence and it favours the legislature. Congress does nothing; the money gets spent. The president proposes, and only an affirmative vote disposes. That is the power of the purse translated into a deadline.

Now read it as a rule about dates. The 45-day period is not forty-five days. Section 682 defines it as forty-five calendar days “of continuous session,” excluding days on which either chamber stands adjourned for more than three days to a day certain. The House is out through the November election. The money in this package is fixed-period appropriation that expires on 30 September. The clock cannot run out before the money does. Congress’s failure to act, which the statute treats as a refusal to rescind, becomes the means of rescinding.

The gap the drafters left

The administration’s reading is worth stating at its strongest. Section 684, on deferrals, says in terms that a deferral may not extend beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the message is transmitted. Section 683, on rescission proposals, contains no such limit. The Office of Management and Budget reads the contrast as deliberate, and the Congressional Research Service records the argument in its sidebar on pocket rescissions, together with the administration’s framing of the outcome as something that happens “because of the operation of law, rather than its repeal.”

The difficulty with reading a silence as a grant is that this one would be enormous. A deferral that cannot outlive the fiscal year is a delay. A rescission proposal that can outlive it is a cancellation, achieved without the vote the same section spends four subsections describing.

What the auditors decided, and when

The Government Accountability Office settled the question for itself in December 2018, in decision B-330330. The Act, it held, “does not permit the withholding of funds through their date of expiration,” and nothing in the text, the history or the case law lets a president “unilaterally abridge the enacted period of availability of a fixed-period appropriation.” Then the line that does the work: “The Constitution vests in Congress the power of the purse, and Congress did not cede this important power through the ICA.” The decision overrules GAO’s own earlier and more permissive opinions, which is why an administration can gesture at older practice without inventing it. In August 2025 the office restated the position in four words: “A pocket rescission is illegal.”

What GAO has not done is rule on this package. Its impoundment page carries nothing dated 2026. When Collins says the office “has concluded that pocket rescissions are unlawful,” she is citing a general holding, correctly, and not a finding about these eleven accounts.

Nobody reaches a courtroom in five days

Last year’s attempt — a $4.9 billion foreign-aid package sent on 28 August 2025 — established the shape of what follows. The D.C. Circuit held that because Congress gave the Comptroller General a right of action, other plaintiffs could not sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. A month later the Supreme Court, on its emergency docket and without deciding the merits, paused an order requiring roughly $4 billion to be obligated before the year ended. Justice Kagan, dissenting, said the effect was to keep the funds from their intended recipients “not just now but (because of their impending expiration) for all time.”

That leaves the Comptroller General. Section 687 lets him sue — after filing an explanatory statement with the Speaker and the President of the Senate, and then waiting twenty-five calendar days of continuous session. The recess that stretches forty-five days past 30 September stretches twenty-five past it too. Every lock in the Act is keyed to a calendar that is not in congressional hands this month.

Who said so

Collins, who chairs Senate Appropriations, put the institutional objection more sharply than any Democrat: “OMB is an agency of the executive branch. It does not get to decide which programs are worth funding.” She also made the narrower and more damaging claim, that the timing proves an earlier violation: OMB “intentionally withheld these funds for months to execute this unlawful cancellation,” and “the delay itself” was “an impoundment that was not reported to Congress.”

She is, as of Sunday, the only Republican appropriator on the record; the House Appropriations majority has said nothing. Patty Murray, the committee’s vice chair, addressed her statement to the other party: “Every Republican who voted for these bills should be furious.” Rosa DeLauro called it “an end run around Congress”; Jeff Merkley supplied the name that will stick: “A pocket rescission is an illegal line-item veto.”

Merkley is describing something the Supreme Court struck down in 1998, when Congress tried to hand it over on purpose. What is claimed now was never handed over. It was found in the space between two sections of a statute written to prevent this, and it works because the calendar says the argument cannot be finished in time. A deadline is a neutral object until somebody schedules around it. Then it is a veto nobody has to sign.

Owen Blackwood writes for The 13th Bell on legislatures and procedure. This piece was edited and fact checked before publication.

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